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THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS IN THE 
DETERMINATION OF AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE1 
WILLIAM T. ALLEN* 
ARTHUR SIEGEL**  
INTRODUCTION 
Neither auditors nor our system of regulating their function has ever 
received the degree of public scrutiny and skepticism as that which 
followed the violent collapse of Enron, and the sorry parade of 
bankruptcies and accounting re-statements in its wake. In the age of 
innocence that preceded the implosion of Enron, in the booming stock 
market where momentum investors looked to the thundering herd rather 
than at fundamental value, the market was not very much interested in 
auditors. Certainly we all realized that in theory the quality or integrity of 
financial information was vital to the operation of our capital market 
centered brand of capitalism. But in practice no one cared very much 
about them. The Big Five public audit firms had a wonderful brand. 
Accounting was seen as providing dated and “conventionalized” 
information that is not of such great use in pricing stocks. There were 
dissenters from the panglossian view that, by and large the reporting of 
financial information was just fine. Most notably former SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt dissented. To his credit, Mr. Levitt perceived the risks that 
were arising from a hot stock market and from auditors who were re-
designing their identities. In the old days auditors were risk averse 
professionals, whose training was to keep people coloring within the lines. 
But Levitt saw them evolving into sleeker (and financially more 
ambitious) professionals who wanted out of their old identity and into a 
new one. Auditors in the 1990s started thinking of themselves as partners 
with their clients in value creation. Levitt saw the risks that this evolution 
posed but he could not really interest the market in this issue. In the end 
Chairman Levitt could not find political support for implementation of his 
 1. The views expressed in this essay reflect only the views of its authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of any other person with whom they were associated in the work undertaken by the 
Independence Standards Board. 
 * Jack Nusbaum Professor of Law & Business and Director, Center for Law & Business, New 
York University; Of counsel Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York; Former Chair, Independence 
Standards Board. 
 ** C.P.A., Former Executive Director, Independence Standards Board. 
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view of appropriate public policy with respect to auditor’s permissible 
activities. 
For the rest, we simply didn’t see what Levitt saw. But in time we, who 
needed to be hit over the head, were, repeatedly. Finally, our heads were 
so remarkably lumpy from these rude surprises that Congress tried to call 
a halt. With astonishing speed and near unanimity it enacted the wide 
ranging reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Perhaps the most important reform contained in this legislation is the 
restructuring of the governance of the auditing profession. Now by statute 
auditors are precluded from providing to their audit clients a long list of 
non-audit services, including design of information and control systems 
and internal auditing services. Equally importantly now a new regulatory 
structure—the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—will 
govern the oversight of the auditing profession. (It may now seem quaint 
to refer to auditors as professionals and not an industry, but this is our 
habit). Importantly, among the specific responsibilities of the new Board is 
the assurance of auditors independence and the adoption of rules or 
standards to assure it. 
Thus, auditor independence took a large step forward when the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed.2 In addition, the sad failure of Arthur 
Anderson as a consequence of its complaint auditing, itself has 
presumably done much to induce the final four to act with independence 
and rectitude. Thus auditor independence is presumably stronger today 
than ever in recent history. Yet threats to independence continue to 
represent risks to our system. No fact more tellingly establishes that 
independence remains potentially problematic, even though consulting is 
now made illegal, than the fact that Arthur Anderson reportedly received 
approximately $26 million in audit fees from Enron. Worldcoms audit fees 
were of the same magnitude. Audit fees of this size are alone large enough 
to tempt audit partners from the narrow path of rectitude. Thus, complex 
issues of auditor independence do remain after passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. 
The existing SEC rule, Rule 2-01 under Regulation S-X3 which 
represented a required political compromise, is not adequate to deal with 
why important remaining independence issues in a rational and 
comprehensive way. The new Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board will have to do so. 
 2. Parenthetically that it probably took at least as large a step forward when Arthur Anderson 
was forced into bankruptcy as a result of its Enron choices its partners made.  
 
 3. 17 CFR § 210.2.01.  
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The essay that follows was written before enactment into law of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It attempts a brief explication of an existing 
conceptual framework for determining issues of auditor independence: that 
of the staff of the Independence Standards Board and suggests that 
approach is a much sounder way to address remaining issues of auditor 
independence than the approach reflected in the existing SEC Rule. 
Because the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is charged 
with addressing issues of auditor independence it will have to try to think 
conceptually about what we want from a requirement of auditor 
independence and what we are willing to forego in order to have it. The 
SEC should encourage it to do so and allow it to replace the political 
comprise of the existing Rule. 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE AUDITOR’S ATTESTATION 
Investors rely on the integrity of the auditor’s attestation. Independent 
expert judgment is the alpha and the omega of the auditing profession. A 
primary bulwark of this reputation for integrity is the auditing profession’s 
long commitment to independence. Of course, perfect independence of 
judgment is not possible in this world. The fact that we have always 
permitted multi-year auditing relationships and, more basically, that 
auditors are private professionals who receive a fee from clients, means 
that threats to independence of judgment are unavoidable. Collectively, it 
is advantageous for the accounting industry to assure the capital market 
that the auditor’s attestation adds real value. Thus, for decades, an 
important source of professional and regulatory concern has been defining 
the sorts of relationships or circumstances that may create too great a risk 
of impairing auditor independence.  
This task was made more difficult over the last twenty-five years by the 
evolution of auditing firms into the providers of multiple professional 
services to their audit clients. Driven by the expertise (especially 
information system expertise) within these firms, clients became 
increasingly likely to call upon these trusted professionals to supply other 
services—some closely related to preparation of financial statements and 
some rather removed from the auditors’ core expertise. Also, clients 
increasingly relied on auditing firms because the firms knew their clients, 
the clients trusted the firms, and the firms were a source of sophisticated 
business knowledge. In retrospect, it does not seem surprising that these 
firms would evolve into providers of multiple services. But the growth of 
multiple relationships began to cast shadows on the vital perception of 
independence of auditing firms. By the 1990s, it appeared that some 
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overall review of the criterion for evaluating auditor independence would 
be prudent.  
In June of 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
joined with the major accounting firms and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) to form the Independence 
Standards Board (“ISB”).4 The SEC changed the ISB to review the 
existing regulation of independence and to promulgate, through a public 
process, standards for determining auditor independence.5 Unless 
explicitly rejected by the SEC, these standards were entitled to prima facie 
validity.6  
The ISB, in undertaking its task, understood that auditor independence 
is an instrumental value. We value auditor independence in our market not 
for its own sake, but because we suppose, quite sensibly, that it is 
associated with greater auditor objectivity in reviewing financial 
statements for conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
(“GAAP”). Thus, in addition to auditor independence, we want expert 
knowledge of the audit client and of accounting conventions, objectivity in 
assessing compliance with GAAP, and efficient review and audit 
procedures. Achievement of these valid ends, however, may sometimes be 
in tension with steps designed to increase our belief in the independence of 
auditors.  
Discussion of the subject of auditor independence and the trade-offs 
that its regulation entails is made difficult, however, because we lack both 
a common understanding of the terms used and a unifying approach to 
resolving the issues raised. In short, we lack a conceptual framework 
within which to assess the relative importance of possibly inconsistent 
goals. This Article outlines an approach to this problem developed by the 
Independence Standards Board. In December of 2000, the SEC abandoned 
the principles-based approach to creating independence standards and 
rules when it adopted a rule premised on a different approach. We believe 
that the approach adopted represents a lost opportunity. We, of course, do 
not disagree that it is vital for our capital markets to be well informed and 
that the value of the auditors attestation is dependent on the perception of 
the integrity of that attestation. Nor do we disagree that the independence 
of the attesting firm and the perception of it are fundamentally important 
 4. See Commission Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Standards 
Related to Auditor Independence, SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 50 (Feb. 17, 1998), available 
at http://www.cpaindependence.org/textview.php3?doc_id=frr50.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
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to the judgment that financial statements are dependable. Thus, our 
disappointment with the new rule is not premised on a belief that serious 
threats to auditor independence should be condoned. For us, however, the 
optimal legal regulation of auditor independence requires a more textured 
assessment of social costs and benefits than the existing rule contemplates. 
This Article outlines some elements of an alternative approach the ISB 
staff prepared in a public process: the Conceptual Framework for Auditor 
Independence. That framework represents the road not taken by the SEC 
when it adopted its current rule. The current rule, in fact, is a rushed, 
pragmatic effort to deal with a series of complex problems. It lacks a 
coherent conceptual framework to explain its choices and to guide its 
implementation by thousands of corporate directors, chief financial 
officers, and auditors.  
In this short Article we attempt to articulate some of the differences 
between the approach taken by the ISB in fashioning independence 
standards and the approach of the SEC-adopted rule. A fuller 
understanding of those differences emerges from a review of the ISB Staff 
Report on the ISB conceptual framework for auditor independence.  
REGULATING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
A key piece in the implementation of the disclosure philosophy upon 
which Congress premised the Securities Act of 19337 and the Exchange 
Act of 19348 was the requirement that issuers subject to these Acts would 
be required to file financial statements publicly, in a form approved by the 
SEC. These financial statements must be audited by “independent” 
professionals.9 Neither the statutes nor the regulations, however, define 
“independent.” Thus, from the earliest years of this regulatory regime, the 
SEC and the accounting profession itself have defined what types of 
activities and relationships create conflicts of interest that could cause the 
auditor to lose its independence. This process was largely ad hoc, with the 
Ethics Committee of the AICPA and the staff of the SEC both issuing 
opinions or rulings about whether independence was impaired under 
various sets of facts.  
Not surprisingly, after half a century of this ad hoc process, this 
regulatory terrain was rather anything but smooth. As rules and 
interpretations became more finely detailed with the evolution of a more 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000).  
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).  
 9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2000).  
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complex practice environment, the old regulatory system of ad hoc rulings 
increasingly appeared inadequate. Thus, in recent years, both the SEC and 
AICPA found that detailed rulemaking was becoming increasingly 
difficult and time consuming. Furthermore, because there were no 
unifying principles, practitioners and other interested parties had difficulty 
applying the existing rules to the large number of new situations that they 
were facing. 
Consequently, in 1997, under the same authority used by the Financial 
Standards Accounting Board for establishing accounting standards, the 
SEC and AICPA jointly agreed to the formation of a partly public and 
partly private agency to establish, through public notice and participation, 
a principles-based approach to the regulation of auditor independence. The 
result was the ISB, comprised of eight members: four members were 
prominent private citizens not associated with the accounting profession, 
though highly knowledgeable concerning matters of business or finance, 
and the other four were senior members of the accounting profession.10 A 
small staff and an Independence Issues Committee assisted the Board and 
formed broad-based task forces for each ISB project.11 The AICPA’s SEC 
Practice Section supplied funding but had no substantive authority over 
the ISB.  
During its tenure the ISB was active, producing three authoritative 
statements and establishing working groups on a number of other specific 
projects.12 The ISB’s basic task, however, was the establishment, via 
public process, of a conceptual framework to remove independence 
regulation from the morass of ad hoc-ism to a principles-based enterprise. 
 10. The “public” members of the ISB were: John Bogle, Founder and then Chairman of 
Vanguard Funds, Inc.; Dr. Manuel Johnson, former Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board; Robert 
Denham, Esq., then-Chairman of Salomon Smith Barney; and William T. Allen, former Chancellor of 
the Delaware Court of Chancery and now a Professor of Law & Business, New York University. See 
http://www.cpaindependence.org/textview.php3?doc_id=isbrostr. 
 11. See id. for a listing of the members of each of the project task forces.  
 12. For specific ISB-issued projects, see generally STANDARDS BD., DISCUSSION 
MEMORANDUM: EVOLVING FORMS OF FIRM STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION (1999); INDEPENDENCE 
STANDARDS BD., DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM: LEGAL SERVICES (1999); INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS 
BD., INVITATION TO COMMENT: FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE AUDITOR AND THE AUDIT 
CLIENT (1999); INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., STANDARD NO. 1: INDEPENDENCE DISCUSSIONS 
WITH AUDIT COMMITTEES (1999); INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., STANDARD NO. 2: CERTAIN 
INDEPENDENCE IMPLICATIONS OF AUDITS OF MUTUAL FUNDS AND RELATED ENTITIES (amend. 2000); 
INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., STANDARD NO. 3: EMPLOYMENT WITH AUDIT CLIENTS (2000). All 
of these ISB projects are available at http://www.cpaindependence.org. 
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THE ISB’S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROJECT 
The ISB’s enabling document charged the ISB with “[d]evelop[ing] a 
conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits of public 
entities which will serve as the foundation for the development of 
principles-based independence standards.”13  
The ISB very early organized to undertake this foundational task in a 
way that was both deliberative and transparent. The ISB engaged Henry R. 
Jaenicke, the C.D. Clarkson Professor of Accounting at Drexel University, 
as director of the Conceptual Famework Project, and Alan S. Glazer, 
Professor of Business Administration at Franklin & Marshall College, as 
associate director. Professors Jaenicke and Glazer worked with Arthur 
Siegel, Susan McGrath, and Richard H. Towers of the ISB staff, and 
Professor Thomas W. Dunfee, the Joseph Kolodny Professor of Social 
Responsibility and vice-dean and director of the undergraduate division of 
the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, who served as an 
advisor on ethical issues (collectively, “the staff”). In addition to this 
group the ISB worked through a project task force, a Board oversight task 
force, and the Board itself. In February of 2000, the Board issued a 
Discussion Memorandum on auditor independence and in November of 
2000, it issued an Exposure Draft of its Statement of Independence 
Concepts.14 Events in the form of changing political climate and the SEC-
adopted rule of December of 2000 led the SEC to abandon its commitment 
to the ISB as an agency for formulating independence concepts (subject to 
SEC acceptance). The ISB, at the suggestion of the SEC, dissolved in July 
of 2001.15 Before doing so, however, at the ISB’s last meeting, the Board 
issued the draft of its final statement of independence concepts16 that the 
staff had prepared for Board consideration.17 
 13. Independence Standards Board Operation Policies, art. 1, para. 1.B, available at 
http://www.cpaindependence.org/textview.php3?doc_id=isboppol. 
 14. See INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE (2000); INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., EXPOSURE 
DRAFT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE (2000), available at 
http://www.cpaindependence.org.  
 15. Press Release, AICPA and SEC, Independence Standards Board to Close (July 17, 2001), 
available at http://www.cpaindependence.org.  
 16. INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., STAFF REPORT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE (2001), available at http://www.cpaindependence.org [hereinafter 
INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK]. 
 17. Id. at 2. The Staff Report therefore reflects the staff’s ideology, which was influenced by 
“Board deliberations and its [unanimous] preliminary conclusions reflected in the DM and the ED; 
comments received from respondents on the DM and ED; and input from the project task force, the 
Board oversight task force, and other interested parties on drafts of the DM and ED as well as on an 
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The ISB Staff Report on a Conceptual Framework is the culmination of 
many months of consideration by the Board, its staff, and a large public 
task force. Seeking to construct a conceptually-based approach, the 
framework began with something notably absent from previous efforts: a 
definition of independence for auditors. The Staff Report stated that  
[a]uditor independence is both (a) independence of mind—freedom 
from the effects of threats to auditor independence that would be 
sufficient to compromise an auditor’s objectivity and (b) 
independence in appearance—absence of activities, relationships, 
and other circumstances that would lead well-informed investors 
and other users [of the audited financial statements] reasonably to 
conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an auditor lacks 
independence of mind.18 
This definition is notable in that it focuses both on objectivity and the 
appearance of objectivity. Thus the first prong of the definition is meant to 
catch (or disqualify) any auditor who in fact is not objective with respect 
to the audit. The second prong of the definition is meant to disqualify any 
auditor, even if in fact he is capable of making objective judgments, who 
is so situated that a reasonable person of ordinary character would be 
expected to have his objectivity subject to unacceptable risk of 
impairment.19 In incorporating the idea of “unacceptable risk,” this 
definition of auditor independence acknowledges that because perfect 
independence is not possible, judgment is unavoidably present in 
determining whether an auditor is influenced by forces or circumstances 
that may impair independence.  
Importantly, this definition does not treat auditor independence as a 
goal in its own right. The ISB began with the premise that the system 
should not to try to maximize “independence,” but rather should optimize 
the quality of financial statements. Not every potential conflict will, in this 
view, disqualify an auditor. The ISB conceptual framework uses the term 
“compromised independence” to identify circumstances in which a 
relationship or activity deems the auditor incapable of making objective 
audit decisions. When determining which risks to an auditor’s 
earlier draft of [the Staff Report].” Id. 
 18. Id. at para. 5. 
 19. The Conceptual Framework notes that regulatory and other standard-setting bodies issue 
authoritative guidance that limit or proscribe certain activities or relationships by all auditors. 
Therefore, although certain individuals may legitimately claim to be objective even if they have 
relationships that are proscribed, they must still comply with all of the authoritative rules in order to be 
independent. Id. at para. 8. 
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compromised judgment are, from the public’s perspective, worth bearing 
and which risks ought to be disqualifying, the conceptual framework first 
employed a cost-benefit analysis. Second, the conceptual framework 
recognized that in some circumstances, threats to independence may be 
reasonably ameliorated in ways other than disqualification; safeguards 
effectively designed and deployed could effectively assure independence 
of judgment. 
Consider an example. After studying the existing rules prohibiting all 
partners in an accounting firm and their immediate family members from 
owning any stock in any audit client, the ISB tentatively concluded that 
these rules were not justified in cost-benefit terms. The costs were 
significant. Each of the five largest accounting firms had between two and 
three thousand SEC registrant audit clients and thousands of partners 
located throughout the United States and around the world. Thus, although 
only a handful of partners might actually work on a particular audit or are 
in a position to influence it, all partners and their family members were 
disabled from owning stock in the audit client under the existing rule. 
Especially in a world of two-career families, this rule discouraged people 
from aspiring to partnership in audit firms. Candidates for partnership and 
their immediate family members, for example, had to sell shares that they 
owned in any audit client and pay income taxes on any gains as a “price” 
of admission to the firm. Also, all partners had to sell any shares that he or 
she or their immediate family members owned if a firm in which the 
partner had a passive investment elected to become a client firm, even if 
that partner had no involvement with that new account. The ISB, seeking 
optimal—not perfect—independence, concluded that real independence 
concerns could be well addressed and wasteful costs eliminated by a 
standard that focused more finely on the risks of stock ownership. In its 
December of 2000 rulemaking, the SEC agreed with the ISB’s conclusion 
that the costs of the old rule exceeded its benefits. The SEC’s new rules, 
adopted from the ISB’s new standard—the concept of “covered person,” 
limits the stock ownership prohibition to the members of the audit team, 
the “chain of command,” and a limited, defined group of others.20 This 
liberalization removed a major irritant for partners, thereby improving the 
quality of people attracted to and retained by the profession, without 
substantially impairing auditor independence. This change in the prior 
approach is, however, only a particularization of a broader idea not fully 
 20. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 
76,008, at 76,062 (Dec. 5, 2000) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 210 and 240).  
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reflected in the SEC’s December rulemaking: that there are costs 
associated with prohibitions that should be evaluated from a social 
perspective when regulating behavior. 
THE ISB’S THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS APPROACH 
The ISB Conceptual Framework21 is an attempt to provide a structure 
for analyzing problems of this type. Its foundation is the definition of 
independence discussed above. To achieve a greater assurance of auditor 
independence, the Conceptual Framework constructs a multipart 
framework that focuses on threats to independence and safeguards to 
assure independence. The Conceptual Framework defines “threats to 
auditor independence” as “pressures and other factors that impair an 
auditor’s objectivity”22 and safeguards as “controls that mitigate the effects 
of threats.”23 The Conceptual Framework further identifies five sources of 
threats to objectivity: 
 a. Self-interest threats—threats that arise from auditors acting in 
their own interest. Self-interests include auditors’ emotional, 
financial, or other personal interests. Auditors may favor, 
consciously or subconsciously, those self-interests over their 
interest in performing a quality audit. For example, auditors’ 
relationships with auditees create a financial self-interest because 
auditees pay the auditors’ fees. Auditors also have a financial self-
interest if they own stock in an auditee and may have an emotional 
or financial self-interest if an employment relationship exists 
between an auditor’s spouse and an auditee. 
 b. Self-review threats—threats that arise from auditors reviewing 
their own work or the work done by others in their firm. It may be 
more difficult to evaluate without bias one’s own work, or that of 
one’s firm, than the work of someone else or of some other firm. 
Therefore, a self-review threat may arise when auditors review 
judgments and decisions they, or others in their firm, have made. 
 c. Advocacy threats—threats that arise from auditors or others in 
their firm promoting or advocating for or against an auditee or its 
position or opinion rather than serving as unbiased attestors of the 
 21. INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., STAFF REPORT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 
16. 
 22. Id. at para. 15. 
 23. Id. at para. 19. 
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auditees’ financial information. Such a threat may be present, for 
example, if auditors or others in the auditing firm serve as 
promoters for an auditee’s securities. 
 d. Familiarity (or trust) threats—threats that arise from auditors 
being influenced by a close relationship with an auditee.24 Such a 
threat is present when auditors are not sufficiently skeptical of an 
auditee’s assertions and, as a result, too readily accept an auditee’s 
viewpoint because of their familiarity with or trust in the auditee. 
For example, a familiarity threat may arise when an auditor has a 
particularly close or long-standing personal or professional 
relationship with an auditee. 
 e. Intimidation threats—threats that arise from auditors being, or 
believing that they are being, overtly or covertly coerced by 
auditees or by other interested parties. Such a threat may arise, for 
example, if an auditing firm is threatened with replacement over a 
disagreement about an auditee’s application of an accounting 
principle, or if an auditor believes that an auditee’s expression of 
client dissatisfaction would damage his or her career within the 
firm.25 
The Report notes that 
[t]he significance of a threat depends on many factors, including the 
nature of the activity, relationship, or other circumstance creating 
the threat; the force with which pressure is exerted or felt; the 
importance of the matter that is the subject of the activity, 
relationship, or other circumstance; the position and level of 
responsibility of the persons involved; and the strength of the 
integrity of the persons involved.26 
The Conceptual Framework also provides various techniques of 
categorizing safeguards in response to threats. Evidently a variety of 
responses to threats is possible. The Conceptual Framework identifies four 
levels of response available to a standard setter. These include: 
 24. One recalls in Terry Gilliam’s brillant movie Brazil of some years ago a scene placed in a 
grim office in a future age, in which privacy and individuality only existed as suspect if not forbidden 
states. In this scene the players acted out their parts while, unremarked upon, on a wall behind them, 
hung a sampler with the folk wisdom of that place: “Trust in Haste, Repent at Leisure.”  
 25. Id. at para. 17. 
 26. Id. at para. 18. 
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  a. absolute prohibition—for example, barring auditors from 
having any direct financial investment in any auditees; 
 b. permitting the activity or relationship but restricting its extent 
or form—for example, a restriction that auditors cannot have 
material indirect financial interests in auditees; 
 c. permitting the activity or relationship but requiring other 
policies or procedures that eliminate or mitigate the threat—for 
example, the mandatory replacement of an engagement partner after 
the partner has spent a certain period of time on a specific audit 
engagement to mitigate a familiarity threat; and 
 d. permitting the activity or relationship but requiring the auditor 
to disclose information about it to the audited client’s management, 
audit committee, board, or others—for example, disclosure to an 
auditee’s audit committee of the nature of all services provided by 
the auditor to the auditee and the fees received for such services.27 
The Conceptual Framework defines “independence risk” as “the 
likelihood that an auditor’s objectivity (a) would be compromised or (b) 
reasonably would appear compromised to well-informed investors and 
other users.”28 This risk is evaluated both before and after consideration of 
the affected safeguards. 
Finally, the Report directs the consideration of “three basic principles 
of auditor independence”:  
 a. consider[] the level of independence risk and assess[] its 
acceptability; 
 b. consider[] benefits and costs of possible regulation [of threats 
to independence]; and 
 c. consider[] the views of investors and other interested parties.29 
Thus, the ISB’s Conceptual Framework constitutes a comprehensive 
statement providing a rational and internally consistent approach to 
independence decisions, both in the formulation of general prescriptions or 
prohibitions and in the formulation of application decisions that 
 27. Id. at para. 63. 
 28. Id. at para. 23. 
 29. Id. at para. 25. 
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professionals must make from time to time. The utility of such a 
comprehensive framework seems apparent. Regarding the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board framework, one observer has noted: 
Without the underlying guidance of a conceptual framework, 
standard-setting would be based on the personal and unarticulated 
concepts of the individual Board members. This would make 
agreement on standard-setting issues possible only when the 
individual frameworks sufficiently converged. Without a single 
framework, the answers to issues could change as the Board 
membership changes.30 
The alternative to working within an expressed conceptual framework 
is unattractive. Without such a framework, independence issues are 
heavily dependent on the views of the incumbent chief accountant of the 
SEC, who, in recent years at least, has been replaced every two or three 
years. Each chief accountant is required to develop his own approach to 
auditor independence, without the benefits of some unifying set of criteria. 
This method is at best inefficient and at worst inconsistent, unpredictable, 
and unfair to those who must comply with and apply the rules. 
THE PRAGMATIC NEW RULE 
Concern that the ISB process would not achieve the goals of the SEC 
in a timely fashion motivated the SEC’s new independence rule. Rule 2.01 
does not, however, supply a coherent framework that will allow others to 
understand the lines drawn or those that need to be drawn in the future. In 
adopting the rule, the SEC adopted much of the specific standard-setting 
work that the ISB had accomplished. Yet, in fact, the fundamental 
underpinning of the ISB’s approach to setting independence principles—
the analysis of threats to and safeguards protecting independence was 
rejected. For example, in discussing employment relationships, the view 
was expressed: 
We appreciate the concepts underlying ISB Standard No. 3 and 
strongly support firms’ use of quality controls and “safeguards” to 
encourage their partners and employees to be aware of and adhere 
to auditor independence standards. We are concerned, however, that 
a “safeguards” approach, which is dependent on a firm’s self-
 30. Independence Standards Board Minutes of Meeting (July 2001) (transcript on file with 
author). 
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analysis and self-reviews, will not provide a definitive standard. In 
our view, independence is better assured by consistent and uniform 
rules, rather than by rules that rely on the auditor’s assessment of 
the extent of its own self-interest. Furthermore, it has been our 
experience that the existence of safeguards or quality controls alone 
does not ensure compliance with even the most basic independence 
regulations. Accordingly, we have chosen a more objective standard 
for employment relationships . . . .31 
First, this statement is a reflection of what appears to be a genuine 
belief on the part of the SEC staff that the first attribute of a profession—
conscientious self-regulation by men and women of good character—is 
not a serious part of the staff’s conception of the modern auditing industry. 
Reasonable persons may disagree whether such skepticism is realistic and 
in the public’s interest. While we are not apologists for the auditing 
industry, our underlying view of the character (and the economic 
incentives) of members of this profession is different. Moreover, this 
statement misunderstands the way in which the ISB implemented the 
threats and safeguards approach. For example, in ISB Standard No. 3,32 the 
ISB did adopt “definitive standards.”33 The ISB required, for example, that 
partners and staff notify the audit firm when they begin employment 
discussions with an audit client, that the person be removed immediately 
from the engagement and his or her work be independently reviewed, and 
that if an offer is accepted, all financial ties with the audit firm must be 
settled immediately in a specified way.34 The SEC actually adopted, 
almost verbatim, all of these requirements and added, in a footnote, 
“Nevertheless, we encourage, and we expect, firms to follow the steps 
described in ISB Standard No. 3 . . . .”35 Those steps were mandated 
procedures under the ISB standard, not an invitation to auditors to 
consider their own self-interests. 
Although in this case the SEC adopted the same safeguards as the ISB 
standard, it did so without explicit consideration of the threats that exist in 
such relationships and an explanatory statement of why the safeguards 
adopted adequately mitigated such threats. Thus, the SEC left several gaps 
 31. Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,039 
(citations omitted).  
 32. INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., STANDARD NO. 3, supra note 12. 
 33. See id. at para. 2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,039 
n.313. 
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in the promulgated rules. For example, in the area of client employment of 
immediate family members, the SEC stated that  
the ISB has taken a more restrictive approach in suggesting that 
independence is impaired if an immediate family member of a 
person on the audit engagement team is employed by the audit 
client in any position. We continue to believe, however, that we 
need only apply our restriction to family members in an “accounting 
role or financial reporting oversight role” at an audit client.36 
This is the exercise of judgment, but on what basis? Because the SEC 
does not analyze the threat posed by “any” employment relationship, its 
rule fails to consider the threat posed by the emotional attachment and 
financial dependence issues that could arise from the employment by the 
audit client of, for example, the spouse of the audit manager in a non-
covered but well-compensated role. Those issues led the ISB to conclude 
that such threats were sufficiently significant to proscribe any employment 
by an immediate family member of audit team members. The SEC’s 
answer may well be preferable to the ISB’s, but to so conclude requires 
one to consider what constitutes the threat that we seek to protect against. 
There are other flaws, we think—or at least unexplained 
inconsistencies—in the SEC’s approach. For example, the SEC prohibits 
legal services to an audit client only when “the person providing the 
service [is] admitted to practice before the courts of a United States 
jurisdiction.”37 As a result, attorneys admitted to practice in foreign 
countries can provide legal services to their firm’s audit clients without 
affecting their firm’s independence, subject only to some specified 
constraints. However, the threats that exist when attorneys from the audit 
firm provide legal services to an audit client are not logically linked to 
where the attorney is admitted to practice. So, we have a rule with a clear 
prohibition, though it is unclear why. In such circumstances, what reaction 
should an audit committee have to a proposal that the audit firm provide 
legal services in France? 
The SEC initially proposed a prohibition of consulting services to audit 
clients involving the design or installation of information technology 
systems. After considering the comment letters and statements at the 
public hearings, the SEC’s promulgated a rule that allows such services 
and adopted pre-existing professional rules regarding the necessary 
 36. Id. at 76,040 (citation omitted). 
 37. Qualifications and Reports of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ix) (2001). 
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involvement of client officials in the project. The final rule also requires a 
proxy statement disclosure of the fees paid to the auditor for such services 
and further requires the audit committee to consider whether such services 
are “compatible with maintaining the [auditor’s] independence.”38 The 
SEC described its resolution of this issue as “a pragmatic approach to a 
difficult issue.”39 Pragmatism is a fair description of a process that is not a 
principled attempt to reason towards consistent rules.  
Pragmatism also supplies a convenient basis for regulators who feel 
free to exercise after-the-fact judgment, but it provides little guidance for 
those who must act in the future. Thus, in January of 2001, the Chairman 
of the SEC felt it necessary to send a letter to audit committees of the top 
five thousand public companies. That letter urged the audit committee 
chairmen, in evaluating the compatibility question, to determine the 
answers to a list of questions posed in the report of the Public Oversight 
Board’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness (“O’Malley Panel”). That report 
stated that “[i]n determining the appropriateness of a particular service, 
one guiding principle should be whether the service facilitates the 
performance of the audit, improves the client’s financial reporting process, 
or is otherwise in the public interest”40 and urged the ISB to provide more 
specific guidance. The questions themselves, however, do not seem 
particularly helpful to an audit committee. The SEC has not said which 
answers to the Panel’s questions are “good” answers. More importantly, 
the Commission does not define the threat that lies at the core of the 
provision of information technology services to audit clients. Even more 
confusing, the SEC’s stated that “we do not see any significant reason for 
concern about an audit firm’s work on hardware or software systems that 
 38. See Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(A)(e)(4) (2001). The 
SEC rule requires disclosure of fees in three categories: (a) “for the audit of the registrant’s annual 
financial statements for the most recent fiscal year and the reviews of the financial statements included 
in the registrant’s Forms 10-Q;” (b) for “[f]inancial [i]nformation [s]ystems [d]esign and 
[i]mplementation” services; and (c) [a]ll [o]ther [f]ees. Id. § 240.14a-101(G)(e)(1)-(3). The narrow 
definition in the first category is quite different from how firms have categorized fees in publicly 
reporting their revenues and in their reports to the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section (“SECPS”). 
Although there is no uniform definition used by all firms, virtually all of the definitions include in the 
audit category fees for such services as statutory audits of subsidiaries, assistance in connection with 
registration statements (including subsequent events reviews and issuance of comfort letters), internal 
audit services, and due diligence investigations of proposed mergers and acquisitions. Under the SEC 
rule, these would be included in the “all other fees” category. The result is to enlarge non-audit fees in 
comparison to audit fees and to make comparisons with other information—that which is reported to 
SECPS—impossible. 
 39. Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,045. 
 40. PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
para. 5.29, at 116 (2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/download.html. 
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are unrelated to the audit client’s financial statements or accounting 
records.”41 This is perhaps helpful in a few instances, but it does not tell 
us, the regulatees, why this is not a problem or why other services are 
problematic. We believe that the independence issues that arise when the 
audit firm designs and installs the audit client’s electronic business system 
or another critical business system, are similar to those involving the 
design of accounting systems. The failure to recognize such similarities, 
we believe, reflects a failure to systematically think through the threats to 
auditor independence that results from the rush to issue a rule. 
Rule 2.01 prohibits the audit firm from providing more than 40% of the 
audit client’s internal audit services if the client has assets of more than 
$200 million. This, too, is simply a “pragmatic” judgment. The SEC says 
the $200 million was adopted 
in recognition of the fact that smaller businesses, many of which 
may be located away from major business centers, could suffer 
particular hardships if we do not provide some exception. We chose 
a $200 million threshold for various reasons. From the available 
data, the $200 million threshold appears to provide a line below 
which not only are the companies themselves smaller, but the 
accounting firms that audit them also tend to be smaller.42 
There are several fallacies with this reasoning. Of course, the fact that a 
company may be smaller does not change the threats that may come from 
internal audit services provided by the independent auditor. Making an 
exception for practical reasons is sensible—it might even meet a cost-
benefit test—but the threat remains. If the SEC permits this exception, the 
SEC should also recognize the increased risks and should place some 
obligations on both the auditor and the client and its audit committee to 
mitigate the additional risks. The SEC imposes no such requirements 
because it rejects “threats-and-safeguards” rationality. Finally, the 
rationale that “the accounting firms that audit [these smaller firms] also 
tend to be smaller”43 is odd. The Big Five firms audit almost thirteen 
thousand SEC registrants out of a total of about sixteen thousand, and no 
more than five hundred could be in the Fortune 500.44 The fact is that the 
Big Five (now four) audit the vast majority of smaller registrants as well 
as virtually all of the larger ones.  
 41. Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,046. 
 42. Id. at 76,048 (citations omitted). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 76,066-67. 
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Finally, there are important independence issues that were brought to 
the SEC’s attention during the exposure period for which the SEC simply 
decided to provide no guidance. These issues will be prime candidates for 
consideration by the PCAOB. The first issue is dependence on an audit 
client. This issue arises when a client’s fees are so large in relation to other 
sources of income that a well-informed person may reasonably question 
the objectivity of the auditor. Many years ago the SEC staff said that an 
independence concern would arise if fees paid by a company or a group of 
affiliated companies exceeded 15% of an audit firm’s gross revenues. The 
problem is far more complex than can be dealt with under this simple rule. 
The issues involve matters such as: how the firm is organized and 
controlled; what are the criteria used to evaluate the partners and staff on 
the engagement; and what is the importance of the fees to the office or 
business unit in which the engagement team practices. By failing to 
address these issues, the SEC has not given appropriate guidance to either 
firms or audit committees in deciding how to consider and resolve them. 
A second important issue for the PCAOB is alternative practice 
structures. Increasingly, firms are organizing in new and innovative ways 
to enable themselves to provide a broader range of services, to enter into 
joint ventures and alliances, and to deal with unfunded pension obligations 
to partners. The most visible of these arrangements involve (a) American 
Express, H&R Block, and Century Business Services, (where the non-
audit services portions of audit firms were acquired by non-auditor 
businesses, leaving the audit firms to provide services to buyer clients 
under contract), and (b) the sale of the consulting business to either a third 
party (Ernst & Young) or the public (KPMG). These arrangements may 
take any form and can raise independence concerns. The SEC’s new rule 
recognizes this development, but rather than providing generic guidance, 
the rule refers readers to previously issued staff letters on these matters 
(which are very fact specific). They give little generalizable guidance. The 
SEC also states that “[w]hile the rules we adopt do not provide accounting 
firms with the certainty of our proposed rule, we are convinced that a more 
flexible approach is warranted as the types and nature of accounting firms’ 
business arrangements continue to develop.”45 The problem, of course, is 
that without understanding what factors are deemed to create significant 
auditor independence risk, firms cannot design structures and 
arrangements that consider such concerns. Yet when the SEC issued its 
ruling, it encouraged registrants and accountants to consult with the 
 45. Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,059. 
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Commission’s Office of the Chief Accountant (“OCA”) before entering 
into relationships, including relationships involving the provision of 
services, which are not explicitly described in the rule. Thus the rule does 
not offer principled guidance, but instead contemplates ex ante 
government negotiations under unstated principles before innovation may 
occur.  
In sum, there is a fundamental defect in the approach reflected in Rule 
2-01. The SEC states rules without providing a rationale. As a result, 
understanding the principles involved—the threats identified—and why 
the SEC chose certain safeguards (including prohibition) is not possible. 
Consequently, those who must comply with the rules every day must 
resort to memorization, rather than comprehension. This leads people to 
conclude that particular conduct is permissible so long as it is not 
explicitly proscribed rather than foster a sense of professionalism. Equally 
important is that those who are responsible for articulating policies for 
their firms and for applying the rules by analogy to new situations, are left 
without tools. Finally, and perhaps also importantly, audit committee 
members who are now charged by law to evaluate the independence of 
their auditors are left without principles to guide them.  
More generally, the requirement or encouragement of firms to 
“consult” with the SEC’s OCA is a dysfunctional way to regulate the 
profession. First, it is expensive, because preparing for and attending a 
meeting with the OCA is not a trivial exercise. It normally involves the 
preparation of a comprehensive memorandum on the issue, virtually 
always with the assistance of the auditor and frequently with the 
involvement of outside counsel. Second, this procedure is time consuming, 
because not only does the advance preparation take time, but there may be 
delays in arranging a meeting with the OCA, as well as further delays in 
getting a decision from the chief accountant. Third, those decisions are 
made behind closed doors, and the only input is from the OCA staff, the 
accounting firm, and the registrant. The broader issues and the views of 
other interested parties are not solicited and therefore are not considered. 
Perhaps most importantly, government officials are normally risk averse. 
Because they are criticized when things go wrong, they tend to take the 
most conservative position. But this may not be in the public’s interest. 
Furthermore, the OCA is short term in its orientation, it frequently resists 
change because change has to be justified, and it tends to ignore the 
collateral effects of its decision, including the frequently predictable, yet 
unintended, consequences. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, we would be remiss if we did not 
acknowledge some of the important benefits of the SEC’s new rules. 
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Previously, the Commission’s auditor independence rules were a 
combination of very general guidelines, many detailed rules, and a host of 
interpretative letters, all of which were fact sensitive and inconsistent. 
Furthermore, some of the letters were unpublished, and most were not 
easily retrievable. So the new rules, by being all in one place, significantly 
improve access and consistency. The new rules also eliminate some of the 
dysfunctional, out-of-date provisions, particularly in the areas of financial 
interests and family relationships, as previously discussed. Finally, the 
process of proposing and adopting the new rules engaged a lot of people 
outside of the accounting profession more deeply in auditor independence 
matters than ever before. Raising the profile of this important issue with 
these constituencies can only have long-term benefits. 
In the end, however, we see the SEC’s approach as flawed and the 
enactment of the Rule 2.01 (with its abandonment of the ISB process) as a 
misjudgment that wasted an opportunity to create a more rational and 
principled basis for this important subject. Perhaps more importantly, the 
ad hoc approach of this Rule is also different from the approach adopted 
recently by the International Federation of Accountants. Section 8 of its 
Code of Ethics, approved in November of 2001, states: 
This section of the Code of Ethics (this section) provides a 
framework, built on principles, for identifying, evaluating and 
responding to threats to independence. The framework establishes 
principles . . . to identify threats to independence, evaluate the 
significance of those threats, and, if the threats are other than clearly 
insignificant, identify and apply safeguards to eliminate the threats 
or reduce them to an acceptable level.46 
As the Chairman’s letter to audit committees shows rather clearly, the 
existing approach to the determination of auditor independence lacks a 
useful conceptual framework. In arguing that a textured and principled 
approach to issues of auditor independence is superior to pragmatic fiat, 
we should not be mistaken for apologists for the accounting profession. 
The ISB and its staff were committed to maintaining and improving the 
fact of auditor independence and its perception in the market place. But 
effective regulation of independence, in the end, will require recognition 
of the fact that audit firms have huge investments in their reputations for 
integrity—expertise is all they sell.  
 
 46. INT’L FED’N OF ACCOUNTANTS, IFAC ETHICS COMM., IFAC CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANTS para. 8.7, at 28 (2001), available at http://www.ifac.org/downloads/ 
ethics. 
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Both before and after passage of Sarbanes—Oxley Act, the main 
problems of independence that arise within these firms today do not, we 
believe, arise because firms in search of greater income chose to trade 
away their independent judgment. That trade would put too much at risk 
for too little benefit. But that same calculation will not hold for all of the 
individuals within firms. For individuals, a rational cost-benefit analysis 
may be much more likely to lead them to compromise their judgment. 
Thus, the public and the auditing firms most often have closely aligned 
interests. The main sources of independence threats arise from inadequacy 
in the control and compensation systems of the firms themselves. These 
threats cannot be optimally treated by the impoverished choice of either a 
broad prohibition or a mandated ex ante negotiation with the SEC. The 
more textured, principle-based approach of the ISB process had, we 
believe, much greater hope of ultimately constructing a system that offered 
high assurance of integrity.  
So long as we continue with private auditors who are paid a fee for 
services, issues of independence will arise and answers will be necessary. 
Now it is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that will be 
charged with that duty, at least in the first instance. We suppose that that 
Board will in time be required to return to some deliberative effort to try to 
provide those answers in a less pragmatic and a more principled way than 
Rule 2.01 has done. The ISB’s Conceptual Framework47 will, we believe, 
be revisited at that time and will provide a thoughtful starting place for 
such an effort.  
 47. INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD., CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 16. 
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